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Abstract 
Referees are assigned to football matches in Turkey by a three-person 
subcommittee formed by Central Referee Committee, a subsidiary of the Turkish 
Football Federation, in a non-transparent way and this procedure makes 
manipulation possible. Therefore, referee appointments are among the topics 
discussed in the football world. It is a major deficiency that the matching theory, 
which has been successful in regulating many problematic markets, has not been 
used to date in football for referee appointments. In this study, a match-referee 
matching model, using the Gale-Shapley algorithm, for the football matches played 
in Turkish professional football leagues is proposed. The match-referee matching 
result offered by this algorithm is the best possible stable matching result for the 
clubs. This matching result is produced in line with the preferences of the clubs and 
clubs' satisfaction is at the forefront. Most importantly, it is obtained through a 
transparent, clear, fair and manipulation-free match-referee matching system. 
Keywords: Matching Theory, Gale-Shapley Algorithm, Football referee 
assignment, Two-sided matching market 
JEL Code: C78, L83, D02 
 
1. Introduction 
Football has three important elements in a match: players, spectators, and 
referee. Referee is the only person authorized to enforce the football game rules 
throughout the match. The referee performs the task of managing the match together 
with the assistant referees but makes the final decision himself. The decisions made 
by the referee during the gameplay are final and cannot be changed. Referee 
decisions during the game have always been a subject of controversy in football. 
Kilcigil and Partal (2003) found that supporters place biased decisions of the referee 
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in the first place in provocation factors causing violence. Similarly, according to 
Polat and Sonmezoglu (2016), referee decisions during game are in the list of on-
field factors that drive supporters to violence in football. In addition to the referee 
decisions during game, Cantez (2021) stated that Turkish Football Federation’s 
(TFF) inaccurate referee appointments are among the most important factors 
affecting the supporter violence. Therefore, referee appointments and referee 
decisions play an active role in fan-originated field incidents during games. The 
Video Assistant Referee System (VAR) has been implemented in order to reduce 
the errors in referee decisions and enable a fairer game management. According to 
Engin and Celik (2019), soccer referees stated that the implementation of the VAR 
system should be continued in order to ensure transparency without creating any 
doubt in the referee decisions. However, even the VAR system is now at the center 
of the dispute on the referee game decisions in the football world. 
In all football organizations, national league and cup organizations or 
international tournaments such as the FIFA World Cup, European Football 
Championship, UEFA Champions League and UEFA Europa League, referees and 
their decisions during gameplay have been criticized. For this reason, organizations 
and people who are responsible from referee assignments are also heavily criticized. 
The situation is not different in Turkey. Each football season, in professional 
football leagues and Turkish Cup competitions, there are controversial referee 
decisions that determine not only the result of the match, but the team that will be 
the champion or relegated. Some clubs even claim that some referees are biased 
towards them and systematically make decisions against them, so that these clubs 
demand that these referees not be assigned to their matches. The lack of information 
on according to which criteria and how the referee appointments are determined 
causes further flaring of the discussions. This puts the Central Referee Committee 
(Merkez Hakem Kurulu, MHK), which works under the Turkish Football 
Federation (TFF) and is responsible for referee appointments, in a tough position. 
There are various researches on referee assignment problem using different 
methodologies to enhance the transparency and objectivity of the assignment 
process. Alarcon et al. (2013) proposed an integer linear programming approach 
that considers balance in the number of matches each referee must officiate, the 
frequency of each referee being assigned to a given team, the distance each referee 
must travel over the course of a season, and the appropriate pairings of referee 
experience or skill category with the importance of the matches. In another work, 
Yavuz et al. (2007) develops a constructive heuristic and a local search procedure 
for a fair referee assignment.  
Unfortunately, none of the works and studies in the existing literature 
consider the preferences of the clubs. At this point, we should look into matching 
theory for a remedy. Matching theory has attracted the attention of many 
researchers from different scientific fields such as mathematics, computer 
engineering, finance, and economics. The success of this theory in practice is the 





main reason for its active use in many markets. It has been very successful in the 
placement of medical school graduates to residency programs in the US since 1995 
(Roth, 1984; Roth ve Sotomayor, 1990; Roth ve Peranson, 1999), in the placement 
of middle school graduate students in high schools in New York since 2004 and in 
Boston since 2006 (Abdulkadiroglu vd., 2005a; Abdulkadiroglu vd., 2005b), in 
placing university students in dormitories (Chung, 2000; Chen ve Sönmez 2002), 
and in regulating the kidney transplant market in the northeastern states of the 
United States and Ohio state since 2005 (Roth, Sonmez ve Unver, 2004). 
The aim of this study is to propose a method for match-referee matching 
that will enable the appointment of referees to football matches in a systematic and 
transparent manner using the matching theory in which the preferences of the clubs 
are at the center of interest. While the great knowledge gained from the studies on 
matching theory in the literature is successfully applied in many problematic 
markets, it is a very important deficiency that it is not used in solving the problems 
in the football market, which creates an economic magnitude of billions of US 
dollars. In particular, with the method proposed in this study, which is an 
application of the algorithm examined by Celik and Knoblauch (2005, 2007) and 
Celik (2009), appointments of referees will be determined transparently in line with 
the preferences of the clubs. Hence, complaints and discussions of club managers 
and fans on referee assignments will be largely avoided. The proposed methodology 
here is very important to be examined and evaluated, since it is applicable to all 
sports played in league style. 
2. Matching Theory 
In order to understand the match-referee matching methodology and its results 
proposed in this study for the appointment of referees to manage football matches, 
it is necessary to address some issues and important points of matching theory. 
Matching theory made great progress with the algorithm (Gale-Shapley algorithm) 
developed for solving the marriage problem in the work of two mathematicians 
David Gale and Lloyd Shapley in 1962 and became the focus of attention of 
researchers from many different scientific fields. The marriage problem is a two-
sided matching problem in which elements from two disjoint sets are matched. In 
the marriage matching problem, how to match n number of men, M = {m1, m2, ..., 
mn}, and n number of women, W = {w1, w2, ..., wn}, with each other considering 
their preference lists for marriage is examined. Each man creates a preference list 
by ranking the women he wants to marry from the most preferred to the least 
preferred. Likewise, women list the men they want to marry in their preference lists, 
starting with the one they prefer the most. A man/woman cannot place two different 
candidates at the same rank in the preference lists. Preference lists should be 
complete, strict, consistent and transitive. The Gale-Shapley algorithm uses these 
preference lists to match men and women for marriage. Accordingly, the matching 
solution, µ, can be written as a one-to-one function. 
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µ : M ∪ W → M ∪ W  
∀w, μ(w) ∈ M ∪ {w} and ∀m, μ(m) ∈ W ∪ {m}  
µ(m) = w ⇔ µ(w) = m, m ∈ M, w ∈ W,  
μ(m) represents the women than men are matched with to marry under the matching 
result and μ(w) represents the men that women are matched with. In case of μ (m) 
= m, it means that the man did not match with any woman as a result of the matching 
and remained single. Similarly, μ(w) = w is the situation where the woman is not 
matched with any man and remains single. There are two versions of the Gale-
Shapley algorithm: i) men make the marriage proposal and ii) women make the 
proposal. If we consider the men-propose version of the algorithm, it performs the 
following steps in order. 
i. Each man proposes to the first woman in his preference list. 
ii. Each woman who received a proposal keeps the offer from the man she prefers 
the most and rejects the others. Each woman is matched tentatively with the man 
who she has not rejected yet. These matched couples are called "engaged" at this 
stage of the algorithm. If the woman who receives a proposal is already engaged, 
she will also consider her fiancée while evaluating the marriage proposals. If she 
receives an offer from a man he prefers to her fiancée, she breaks up with her 
fiancée and holds the proposal of the most preferred man, that is, she gets 
engaged with this person. 
iii. Each rejected man proposes to the next woman in his preferences list. At this 
stage, the algorithm repeats the steps ii. and iii. until there is no rejected man.  
iv. When there is no rejection, the algorithm stops and engaged couples are matched 
for marriage. 
There are some features of the matching result that this algorithm produces 
for the marriage problem. First of all, every matching obtained as a result of this 
algorithm is stable. In stable matches, there is no man and no woman who prefers 
each other over his/her partner. Otherwise, man and woman who prefer each other 
to their current spouses would separate from matched mates and get together for 
marriage. Therefore, the matching result produced by the algorithm would have 
been violated. Stability of the matching result is an important requirement for a 
successful organization of the market to be regulated. If equality between 
candidates is allowed in the preference lists, a stable matching result may not exist. 
Preference lists should be complete and strict, ensuring that at least one stable 
matching exists, that is, the set of stable matchings is not empty (Gale ve Shapley, 
1962). There can be more than one stable matching in a marriage problem, and the 
number of different stable matching solutions is e-1.n. ln(n) on average (Pittel, 
1989). 
Matching result produced by the men-propose version of the Gale-Shapley 
algorithm is the most preferred one for all men among all stable matching results 





and this matching result is called men-optimal matching. In the men-optimal 
matching, men are matched with their best possible option and since the matching 
is stable, a better matching is not possible for men. In addition, although women 
accept or reject the proposals, the men-optimal matching is the least preferred one 
for all women among all matchings in the set of stable matchings. Similarly, the 
stable matching produced by the women-propose version of the algorithm is 
women-optimal and it is the most preferred matching for all women. The women-
optimal matching is also the least preferred stable matching for all men (Knuth, 
1976). 
Some men in the marriage problem can be more popular among women, so 
they may be more preferred than other men. For this reason, these more preferred 
candidates will appear at the top of all women's lists and other less preferred men 
will always be ranked lower. This situation causes similarities, i.e. correlation, in 
the preference lists of women. Similarly, if there are women who are more popular 
for all men, there will be similarities, i.e. correlation, in men's preference lists. As 
the level of correlation in the preference lists increases, the number of stable 
matching results decreases. If all men have exactly the same preference list (perfect 
correlation among men) and all women have exactly the same preference list 
(perfect correlation among women), there is only one stable matching result. In this 
case, men-optimal and women-optimal matchings are the same (Celik and 
Knoblauch, 2005) and both versions of the Gale-Shapley algorithm will produce 
the same matching result. Therefore, it doesn't matter which version of the 
algorithm is used. 
In their work on correlated preference lists, Calderelli and Capucci (2001) 
found that more popular candidates are matched with higher ranked candidates in 
their preference lists compared to their matched mates, where all the preference lists 
are randomly created, i.e., the correlation among the preference lists is zero. In more 
detailed studies on this subject, Celik and Knoblauch (2007) and Celik (2009) 
revealed that the correlation in the preference lists is an important factor affecting 
the satisfaction of men and women from the result of the matching. According to 
these works, as the correlation in the men's preference lists increases (meaning there 
are popular women), men's satisfaction from the matching result decreases and 
women's satisfaction increases. This is because men compete to be matched with a 
few popular women, so that men place those popular women high on their 
preference lists. Similarly, as the correlation in women's lists increases (meaning 
there are popular men), women's satisfaction from the matching result decreases, 
while men's satisfaction increases. The unequal number of men and women in 
marriage matching markets does not cause any change in the information we have 
mentioned so far from the existing literature. In markets where the number of men 
and the number of women are different, some candidates will not be matched, that 
is, they will remain single. 
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Finally, Celik (2009) introduces correlation in the preference lists in the 
roommate’s problem of students who are matched according to their preference lists 
to share the same room in a dormitory. Roommates’ problem is a one-sided 
matching problem where elements are selected from the same set for a matching. 
According to Celik (2009), as the correlation in preference lists increases, students' 
satisfaction from the matching result decreases. In the light of the information we 
have collected from the studies in the matching theory literature so far, we will be 
able to understand the features of the match-referee matching system that we 
propose for referee assignments to football matches much better. 
 
3. Referee Assignments by Turkish Football Federation (TFF) 
According to the Regulations of Central Referee Committee 
(MHK) 
Turkish Football Federation (TFF) is the governing body of football in Turkey. 
The authority to assign, directly or through the relevant boards, the referee, assistant 
referees, fourth and additional assistant referees, observers and mentors required 
for all football, futsal, beach football and HiF (Football for All) competitions 
organized or permitted by FIFA, UEFA or TFF is given to Central Referee 
Committee (MHK), a sub-committee of the Turkish Football Federation, by 
Turkish Football Federation Central Referee Committee Instructions (May 2019). 
MHK consists of a president and eight members appointed upon the proposal of the 
TFF President and the approval of the TFF board of directors. MHK meets with 
absolute majority as often as necessary, and decisions are taken by absolute 
majority. In case of equality of votes, the vote of the MHK president is decisive. 
However, assignments of referee, observer and mentor to the matches of 
professional football leagues, Turkish Cup and Super Cup are made by Professional 
Competition Executive Board (Profesyonel Musabaka Icra Kurulu, PMIK), a 
subsidiary of MHK, consisting of MHK president and two members. MHK 
president is the chairman of this board and two members of PMIK are appointed 
upon the proposal of the president of the MHK and the approval of the TFF board 
of directors. 
Referees are categorized by MHK according to some criteria such as age, 
experience, observer score, number of matches, success in exams and physical 
proficiency tests. These categories are regional referee category, classification 
referee category, top class referee category, and FIFA referee category. Only 
referees from top class referee category can be assigned to the matches of the 
highest tier two professional football leagues (Turkish Super League and TFF 1. 
League) and the final rounds of Turkish Cup. Among the referees in the top class 
referee category, those who meet certain criteria are elected to the FIFA referee 
category and given a FIFA badge with the recommendation of MHK and the 
approval of the TFF board. In addition to football matches in Turkey, FIFA referees 





can be assigned to the matches organized by FIFA, governing body of football in 
the world, and UEFA, the governing body of football in Europe. Therefore, the 
highest quality referees in professional football in Turkey are the referees with 
FIFA badge in FIFA referee category. MHK has the authority to decide to send a 
referee to any sub-category or to promote to any higher category. There is no 
transparency in what criteria MHK president and two members in PMIK consider, 
what evaluations they make and how they give their decision when assigning 
referees to matches in the professional football leagues. Therefore, the club 
managers and presidents who have close relationship with these three people in 
PMIK may cause an injustice in the league competition by having the referees they 
prefer assigned to their matches and/or preventing the assignment of referees they 
do not want. Nobody can guarantee that such situations do not occur in referee 
assignments made by a non-transparent method. For this reason, the establishment 
of an objective and transparent referee appointment system that clubs, football 
players and fans know how to apply will remove the MHK and referees from being 
the focus of many discussions in the football world. 
 
4. Match-Referee Matching Model for Referee Assignments 
If we consider the assignment of referees to the matches in Turkish Super 
League as a matching market, one of the two disjoint sets from which the members 
will be matched is the set formed by Turkish Super League matches played every 
week, and the other set is formed by referees who are competent to manage these 
matches. In order for the Gale-Shapley algorithm to work, we need to know the 
preference lists of the elements in these two sets. It is important that the preference 
lists are complete and strict so that we can find a stable matching result. In 2021, 
there are seven FIFA referees in Turkey (“MHK, FIFA kokartı takmaya aday 
hakemleri FIFA'ya bildirdi” 
https://www.tff.org/default.aspx?pageID=248&ftxtID=34186.). In addition to 
seven FIFA referees, there are 47 referees in the top class category who can be 
assigned to matches in the top two professional leagues (Turkish Super League and 
TFF 1. League) in the 2020-2021 season (Referee and Observer List for the 2020-
2021 Season). For this reason, football clubs in the Turkish Super League can 
include a maximum of 54 referees in their preference lists. Since 10 matches are 
played every week in the Turkish Super League, each referee's preference list will 
consist of 10 matches. 
Every week, each club manager will submit his/her club’s preference list on 
referees to the MHK by listing the referees from the most preferred to the least 
preferred one that (s)he wants to be assigned to the match they will play in that 
week of the league. Since there are two teams playing a match, there will be two 
preference lists submitted for each match. MHK will combine these two lists with 
a method and creates a single preference list for each match. The methodology to 
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be used for combining these preference lists should be determined in the light of 
the information that will be obtained from academic studies and simulations on the 
subject of referee assignments. This topic is excluded from this study as another 
detailed research topic. The methodology to be determined should be fair, taking 
into account the preferences of both clubs, and it should be shared with the public 
in order to prevent manipulation and provide transparency. 
The preference lists of the referees can be created randomly to ensure 
equality among the referees, or a preference list creation algorithm can be 
developed to allow FIFA referees to rank the matches with higher difficulty higher 
in their preference lists. So that, the likelihood of a more difficult match to be 
managed and an experienced FIFA referee to be matched will be higher. A 
methodology similar to the one in Celik (2009), giving more weight to some of the 
possible choices can be used to create such a preference list for each FIFA referee.  
After a preference list for each element in both sets, matches and referees, 
is created, MHK can make the necessary changes to finalize these lists. However, 
MHK should announce these changes publicly with their reasons. Referees who 
have health problems, report a personal excuse, have been sanctioned by MHK for 
any reason, or have to manage another international match very soon may be 
removed from the combined preference lists of the clubs for that week. Similarly, 
in order to prevent the same referee from managing a team's match for two 
consecutive weeks, the matches of the teams managed by a referee in the previous 
week can be removed from the preference list of that referee. This is why some 
referees' preference lists may consist of 8 matches instead of 10. 
After the preference lists are finalized, the Gale-Shapley algorithm is 
employed to produce a matching result. We know that the match-referee matching 
result obtained from this algorithm will be stable. The question to be asked at this 
stage is, which version of the algorithm is going to be used. In the match-referee 
matching system that is tried to be established here, clubs-offer version should be 
used, since the priority should be the satisfaction of the clubs, not the satisfaction 
of the referees. This version produces the club-optimal matching result, which is 
the best possible stable matching for all clubs. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
In this study, a match-referee matching model has been proposed that allows 
the appointment of referees to professional football matches made by three people 
in the PMIK, the sub-committee of the MHK, in a transparent, fair and clearly 
understandable way in the light of valuable information provided by the matching 
theory literature. In the referee assignment model proposed here, satisfaction of the 
clubs will be at the highest possible level as the match-referee matching will be 
made by the Gale-Shapley algorithm in line with the preferences of the clubs. 





Since the preference lists of the clubs are not created randomly, there will 
be similarities, i.e. correlation, in the preference lists of the clubs since the beliefs 
and preferences about referees are shaped by the clubs' own perceptions, 
experiences and thoughts. Especially, FIFA referees and referees who have had 
good performance and shown good management in the recent weeks will appear at 
the top of the preference lists of all clubs while new and inexperienced referees or 
referees who have recently shown bad management will be ranked lower. In such a 
case, according to the results of Celik and Knoblauch (2007) and Celik (2009), as 
the correlation in the preference lists of clubs increases, clubs will be matched with 
the lower ranked referees in the clubs' preference lists compared to the matching 
result when club preferences are created randomly. In other words, the satisfaction 
of the clubs from the matching result will be less. Celik (2009) explains this as 
everyone competes for a few most preferred candidates. Again, based on the 
findings obtained from these studies, as the correlation in the preference lists of the 
referees increases, clubs will matched with the referees who are ranked higher in 
their preference lists compared to the matching result produced by the randomly 
created preference lists for referees. Hence, the satisfaction of the clubs from the 
matching result will increase. 
Ability of each club to affect the match-referee matching is limited to the 
changes they deem necessary in their own preference list before each referee 
assignment procedure but they cannot predict what the outcome will be. It should 
be noted that even a single change in one of the preference lists used in the algorithm 
can change all matches in the matching result. A club can reduce the likelihood of 
an unwanted referee to be assigned to its match, but cannot avoid it, by ranking that 
referee in the last place in its preference list. Although the probability is low, this 
referee may be assigned to this club's match depending on the preference lists of 
other clubs and referees. In such a case, no one can blame the three members of 
PMIK for acting maliciously and assigning the unwanted referee to the match. 
Similarly, a club can rank a very much desired referee in the first place in its 
preference list to increase the likelihood of the referee to be assigned to its match 
but can not guarantee the assignment. The reason for this is that the match-referee 
matching result that the Gale-Shapley algorithm generates for referee assignments 
depends on the preference lists of other clubs and referees. In the system proposed 
here, it is necessary to control many variables in order to manipulate a referee 
assignment, which is almost impossible. Therefore, manipulations that can be done 
through three PMIK members in the referee assignment system used today will not 
be possible in the model proposed here. 
How to create the preference lists for referees and how to apply a method to 
combine the preference lists of the two clubs that will meet in a match require more 
detailed academic research and simulations. These methods should be shared with 
the public in the name of transparency after they are determined as a result of 
academic studies and calibrations. 
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